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Surveying the landscape of midcentury industrial society, Theodor
Adorno and Max Horkheimer observed the strange role of variety
in consumer and cultural goods.
The techniques of mass production
in the factories and studio system
had, oddly enough, managed to
produce not a surface of sameness,
but a great diversity of things. On
the one hand, however, the diversity of goods that faced consumers
was merely apparent, decipherable
as false by “any child with a keen
interest in variety.” On the other
hand, the variety of offerings on
the market was functional and effective at securing the social order.
“Something is provided for all,”
Adorno and Horkheimer gloomily observed, “so that none may
escape.”1 If the Frankfurt school
theorists could peer into contemporary culture, they would observe a
stunning intensification of variety,
as well as a search engine–optimized system for identifying and
catering to niche desires that would
make their imagined color-coded
advertising maps seem quaint by
comparison. The difference between the cultural consumption
analyzed by Adorno and Horkheimer and today’s practices is not
the variety, which has only proliferated. Rather, it is the unidirectional
character of being provided for. The
subject of the industrial society is
positioned as passive in this regard,
whereas the consuming subject
today is active and productive: the
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famous prosumer we’ve heard so
much about.
Today, as we’re told in nearly
every Web 2.0 business book, consumers are not merely provided
with a variety of goods. Prosumers
actively codevelop and coproduce;
successful production depends on
empowering prosumers and valuing their contributions. And such
statements need not be read cynically. The principle of free and open
source software production—that
users will identify bugs and needed
features and contribute code as a
common resource—actually seems
to work, and work beyond the limited sphere of software programming. People contribute videos on
YouTube; contribute T-shirt designs and ratings on Threadless;
contribute entries and up to the
minute updates on Wikipedia; contribute to the marketing of bands,
films, books, political candidates by
sharing, linking, and liking them
on Facebook; contribute images
on Flickr; contribute artwork and
music and poetry with Creative
Commons licenses; contribute endless commentary, opinions, fan fiction, breaking news, and survey
data on Twitter, on blogs, and on
news sites; and so on. This is, indeed, where the first version of the
World Wide Web fell short, still
asking its users to submit information, in order to be better provided
for. The shift from the submit
button of Web 1.0 to the share
button of Web 2.0 can, from this

perspective, be seen as the putatively radical shift away from
being-provided-for and toward
contribution. It was, of course, one
of the signal achievements of cultural studies (or its most notable
ideological production—the jury’s
still out), to show that the passive
consumer of Adorno and Horkheimer’s account was never quite
as passive as they imagined, but if
the variety of goods they saw facing the consumer has multiplied
exponentially, the condition of
being-provided-for has shifted its
directionality completely. The first
clause of their famous diagnosis—
“Something is provided for all”—
might be better rewritten today as
“Everyone may contribute.”
The second clause is trickier.
All this contribution in the area of
new media is regarded as the escape itself, an escape from the passivity, limitations, and gatekeeping
functions of the old media. Using
Twitter, in this sense, is not merely
a matter of coproducing the information sphere. It is, both in the aggregate and at the individual level a
reassertion of publicness that both
overcomes and surpasses the limits
and controls of mass media. This
is, of course, well-worn territory.
The notion that people are empowered by all this contribution might
even be the dominant thought of
our current media sphere. If there
are disputes, they revolve around
whether such contributions are
repressed and restricted (through
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intellectual property laws), or eventually co-opted, folded into the very
media systems from which they are
thought to free people.
The positions are perhaps less
clear-cut in other areas of contribution. The value of the state as
the provider of last resort seems to
experience a dramatic price drop
just as the tendency to contribute media content explodes; today
consumers contribute, sometimes
indirectly and sometimes deliberately, the now commonplace “portion of the proceeds” to all kinds
of charitable causes. The number
of grant-making foundations has
more than tripled since 1975, while
independent giving and corporate
foundation giving have both seen
similar growth since the late 1980s.
It might be easy enough, then, to
detect the resonance between what
Richard Barbrook famously labeled
the “Hi-Tech Gift Economy” that
we see emerging on the Internet
and growth in the nonprofit sector
(the low-tech gift economy?) since
the 1970s and 1980s. If being-provided-for invokes the passive consumer of the bad old days in Web
2.0 discourse, it might also invoke
the so-called entitlements of the industrial state apparatus, themselves
everywhere under threat.2
Other kinds of contributions
that emerged from and became
common since the 1970s and 1980s
could be added to the mix, especially
in the area of finance. In describing
what he calls financialization, or the

“diversion of savings from household economies to . . . securities,”
economist Christian Marazzi highlights the role of the defined-contribution plan: “[I]t was 1981 that
saw the first defined-contribution
pension plan, the 401(k) program,
which, differently from the earlier defined-benefit plans, makes
pension fund benefits dependent
on returns from the securities in
which the funds are invested.”
The emergence of the 401(k) and
similar contribution plans was connected, according to Marazzi, with
the late-1970s “politico-economic
crisis of the international Fordist model;” financialization was
driven by monetary policies and
other policy decisions that had as
their goal “draining off savings in
order to reinforce stock market financing of the economy” (16–17).
The old defined-benefit pensions
of the manufacturing sector might
thus be aligned with the beingprovided-for model of Fordism.
The subject participating in the
defined-contribution plan, on the
other hand, looks much more like
the prosumer (a term itself, incidentally, invented during the same
period) when it comes to the status
of and relationship to the fund. In
the recent labor protests in Wisconsin, labor activists focused primarily on the efforts of the conservative
governor and legislature to strip
public employee unions of their collective bargaining rights, which the
activists identified as the long-term
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threat. The more immediate question, however, involved the level of
contribution to state employee retirement funds: how much should
be contributed (which is to say, provided) by the state, and how much
should be contributed by individuals. The unions offered near total
concessions on this question, presumably a political and rhetorical
loser.3
Mashing up these admittedly
very different domains can be justified, I hope, if the resultant mix
serves to open or extend investigations that critically parse out and
examine the forms of contribution
people engage in, and their political, economic, and aesthetic functions. Much of the critical inquiry
around what we’ve called, in this
issue, open source culture has positioned its practices against traditional models of property and
economic organization, or against
originality in aesthetic production. Viewing contribution as a
generalizable diagram, one that
displaces and supplants beingprovided-for in multiple domains,
may open such inquiry to new
questions. What, for example, are
the resonances between tax policy,
the global nonprofit sector, and the
desire to share images? How do
subjectivities related to contemporary finance capital—and the
recent financial crisis—relate to
the aesthetics of DJing, or corporate contributions of code to open
source projects? Such questions, to

be sure, sound a discordant note at
first. The beats may match better
when we learn that a primary area
of tension in free and open source
projects today is the character of
contribution agreements, which
stipulate the legal status of contributed code; the other time people
commonly encounter contribution
agreements is, of course, when they
sign up for their 401(k) or 403(b)
plans.
The three texts under review
here provide readers with an entry
into mixed forms of contribution
by working through the character
of contribution in multiple political, economic, and aesthetic registers. In both its argument and
accessible style, Clay Shirky’s Cognitive Surplus is perhaps the most
familiar, especially to readers of
other popular studies of network
culture, or, indeed, Shirky’s previous blockbuster Here Comes
Everybody: The Power of Organizing Without Organizations (2008).
While Shirky remains fascinated
by the way individual contribution
to collective projects seems to liberate people from the old restrictive
structures of being-provided-for,
Cognitive Surplus’s most fruitful
aspect is Shirky’s attempt to locate
such contribution within distinct
social and technological systems
while also evaluating the social and
political effects of such generosity.
A far more direct engagement with
the political economy of contribution, and particularly its relation

On contribution societies	 503
to finance capital, can be found in
Bernard Stiegler’s short collection
of modified lectures, For a New
Critique of Political Economy. Much
like Shirky, Stiegler sees what he
calls an “economy of contribution”
as intimately related with nonwork
time. Unlike Shirky (who—surprisingly, given his book’s economic focus and 2010 publication
date—does not discuss the financial
crisis at all), Stiegler seeks to position contribution as an alternative
not merely to the old industrial
economy but also to a neoliberal finance capital.
Aram Sinnreich’s Mashed Up
takes up the political-economic
question in an aesthetic register,
focusing on that most notable of
emerging aesthetic forms: the music
mashup. Mashed Up provides a useful set of categories for evaluating
emerging aesthetic practices that
have most occasioned definitional
disputes on the nature of contribution and property; it is especially
valuable for its attempt to demonstrate gradations within those
practices. While Sinnreich partakes
in the by now familiar moves of
juxtaposing restrictive social forms
of modernity with newer, and presumably less hierarchical or elitist,
practices, Mashed Up is nevertheless
intent on showing how these new
practices develop their own sets of
values, how deterritorialized music
is reterritorialized.
Together, then, the three books
reviewed here may demonstrate

that a discourse almost numbingly
obsessed with intellectual property
disputes is turning to other matters, examining the constitutive
elements and power arrangements
immanent to emerging cultural
production or examining open
source culture’s relationships with
other spheres of activity.
If one question has occupied
nearly all commentators on network culture, it might be this:
Why do people contribute creative works—from software code
to novels to music—so freely on
digital networks? In Cognitive Surplus, Shirky seeks to explain this
phenomenon by developing the
concept of a cognitive surplus and
detailing the conditions that both
create it and enable it to function.
The cognitive surplus is created by
the “amount of unstructured time
cumulatively available to educated
populations,” particularly after the
Second World War—free time that
“began to add up to billions of collective hours per year” (4–5). The
book’s primary historical claim is
straightforward: this free time was
occupied, cognitively, by technological forms that promoted passivity or “pure consumption of
media,” particularly television (15).
It is here that Shirky may be closest to Adorno and Horkheimer,
replaying the trope of movement
from submit to share that marks
so much similar work. What the
emergence of networks makes available is the transformation of the
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surplus into “behaviors other than
passive consumption” (11). Shirky’s
first goal is to analyze the technicosocial configuration that generates
such behaviors, or what he calls the
means, motives, and opportunities
that transform the “raw material”
of the cognitive surplus into something that produces meaning and
value.
This odd factory for transforming the raw material of cognitive
surplus involves, first, tools. Shirky
tells a story by now familiar to students of both print and Internet
culture, in which the age of passive
consumption really begins with
the printing press, which involved
multiple economic risks and the
kinds of scarcity such risks produced. With the emergence of the
Internet as a tool, what we encounter, rather, is abundance, a condition that scrambles our evaluative
categories. While it was always
clear that the particular emergence
of print was historically contingent,
it is more difficult to detect the contingency of all the social valuations
that emerged alongside it. If people
still have trouble processing the aesthetic value of contributions, Shirky
suggests, it is because “abundance
can remove trade-offs we’re used
to,” and so “can be disorienting to
the people who’ve grown up with
scarcity” (49). The communication
tools, no longer controlled and no
longer scarce, make traditional
evaluative categories difficult but
are always in the process of creating

new possibilities. With the tools for
abundant social sharing now in
people’s hands, Shirky turns to the
thorny question of motives. “The
novel modes of charity” emerging
on networks, Shirky suggests, “rely
not only on the existence of tools
that connect us and let us volunteer
our time, talents, or money; they
rely on our being motivated to do
so as well” (82).
On this point, Shirky is perhaps
at his least historical. Drawing on
psychological and economic studies, Shirky argues that “intrinsic
motivations”—among them desires for autonomy, competence,
and belonging, or connectedness—
are “fundamental to human nature” (86). If the previous mode of
social organization served to restrict access to or control over tools
for contributing and connecting, it
also served to suppress or redirect
these innate desires, which were
restricted to private activities: “Our
motivations for using those tools
are the ancient, intrinsic ones, motivations previously remanded to
the private sphere but now bursting
out in public” (95). The machinery
of human nature through which
Shirky runs the raw material of the
cognitive surplus is at the very least
a cause for raised eyebrows here—
one might suggest that these very
desires are immanently produced
within the particular technicosocial configuration, rather than
preexisting it, and that generalizing them as an essential “desire for
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autonomy” (itself a suspect historical or even cross-cultural category)
obscures more than it reveals about
contemporary culture and production. It is a suspicion not quelled by
Shirky’s rather ahistorical modes
of supporting this fundamental
claim. His target, however, seems
to be analysts who would attribute
emerging cultures of contribution
to technology alone.
In any case, the desire to contribute meaningfully also requires,
for Shirky, opportunities (or sites)
for collaboration and coordination.
In this regard, Shirky seeks to add
multiple modes of coordination
to pure market logics, or find the
“optimal” mixture of competitive
and collaborative values that would
promote both quality production
and ethical behavior. So, for example, the empty swimming pools of
1970s California provided the right
competitive and collaborative mix
for the development of modern
skateboarding. In other cases, the
right proportion gravitates against
competition, as in some free software production:
The advances in Apache
(and in all large free software
projects) rely on the existence
of a collaborative group of
people, and the ability to
recruit that group and integrate their work has driven
Apache’s decade-long dominance. Apache doesn’t just
happen to be noncommercial;

it has to be noncommercial in
order to take in contributions
from as many people as it can
as cheaply as it can. (116)
The factory that transforms the cognitive surplus into a value involves
the tools, or technologies, but also
requires configurations of culture
that draw out and satisfy desires
while successfully coordinating a
group’s knowledge-making activities and sense of purpose.
Of course, all kinds of groups
and sharing activities can do that,
so Shirky seeks to establish a scale
of value for the kinds of contributions people make. He turns to this
question in the last part of the book,
developing a set of definitions for
personal, communal, public, and
civic sharing, placing personal sharing at the lower end of the scale in
terms of the difficulty of producing
and maintaining structures, and
the value created for nonparticipants, while locating civic sharing,
which takes “improving society as
its major goal,” at the higher end
(173–75). This set of categories
does not yield many surprises—
production and sharing of ICanHazCheezburger images occupy
the lower personal sharing end,
whereas a Facebook group that effectively combated a religious sect’s
attacks against women in the Indian city of Mangalore produces
civic value. The categorization is
itself, however, a useful heuristic
for parsing out contributions, or
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attuning observers to the multiple
ways contribution, if it is to be read
as the expression of the surplus
set loose from formerly restrictive
structures, transforms both cultural
production and cultural politics.
While primarily a matter of
description on its surface, Shirky’s
text, like much in its popular genre,
is rhetorical, even evangelical.
Shirky is asking those who relied
on the gatekeeping function of
the cultural industries and other
forms of creative participation to
see networks and their forms of
contributions in a different light.
It remains odd that a book about
generosity and emerging forms of
economy and community could be
published in the midst of the worst
financial crisis since the Great Depression without even a passing
mention that financial and housing markets—those other spaces of
coordination both with and against
which he positions his generosity—
had collapsed in near catastrophic
failure, throwing millions into
foreclosure and unemployment.
The absence is no more striking
than when Shirky addresses the
question of free labor. The problem of establishing a labor theory
of contribution has haunted the
discourse of open source culture
almost from its inception; Tiziana
Terranova’s influential 2000 article
“Free Labor: Producing Culture
for the Digital Economy” formalized the question for many in
the academic humanities, but the

question has persisted in popular
form whenever the status of contributors has come up.4 As a result,
most proponents of free culture see
the need to address the question of
free labor. Shirky sets up the problem this way:
People sharing their writing
or videos or their medical
symptoms or seats in their
car are motivated by something other than money.
The people running services
like YouTube and Facebook
want to get paid, and they do.
It can seem unfair for amateurs to be contributing their
work for free to people who
are making money from aggregating and sharing that
work. (57)
Shirky’s solution is to compare such
platforms to a bar where people will
pay more than they would to drink
alone in order to feel “a sense of connectedness,” while the bar owner
will profit from the customers’
mere presence, the sense of connectedness—the scene, perhaps—they
create by being there. For Shirky,
in other words, the entire problem
is stated incorrectly because it drags
along a “fifteenth-century publishing model” and thereby presents
the people contributing to these
sites as workers, where they should
be classified differently: “But what
if the contributors aren’t workers?
What if they really are contributors,
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quite specifically intending their
contributions to be acts of sharing
rather than production? What if
their labors are labors of love” (58)?
The correct economic model for
thinking the status of contributors
is thus not the factory or sharecropping site, but the gathering place.
The model is further supported by
a reading of ordinary consciousness,
as Shirky has it: “[M]ost people affected by this state of affairs don’t
seem to be terribly up in arms about
it” (57) (a remarkably unconvincing addition, since one might say
the same about any number of exploitative relationships). While the
position that these relationships are
about enjoyment and connectedness
rather than traditionally conceived
wage labor may seem somewhat
tone-deaf as unemployment hovered at near 10 percent, there is a
sense in which Shirky’s premise is
correct. It is problematic, at best, to
import concepts of labor developed
in an industrial setting—labor as
being-provided-for—into such arrangements. It is no less problematic, however, to import concepts
of leisure that were themselves developed in industrial contexts. This
is the default move for proponents
of open source culture (Linus Torvalds titled his book Just for Fun:
The Story of an Accidental Revolutionary [2001] on the development
of Linux) but is increasingly a case
where the frequency of justifications demonstrates their nagging
insufficiency.

If Shirky’s omission of the financial crisis has any effect on Cognitive
Surplus, it is to give the book an almost dated feeling, as if the various
analyses emanated from the heyday of such books in the mid-2000s,
markets humming along (toward
a cliff), unemployment at 5 percent. This criticism is, to some extent, unfair—the question may be
beyond the scope of Shirky’s very
well targeted rhetorical and taxonomical goals. At the same time,
popular texts such as Shirky’s on
open source culture might be profitably combined with more critical
texts that do connect the historical
coemergence of such contribution
networks with neoliberal financialization, as has been the project of
much Italian autonomist thought
for the better part of the last decade.
A key recent text for forging such a
connection is Bernard Stiegler’s For
a New Critique of Political Economy.
Stiegler’s short text contains two
lectures. The first, “For a New Critique of Political Economy,” was
adapted from a lecture he delivered in January 2009. The second,
“Pharmacology of Capital and
Economy of Contribution,” was
delivered in December of that year.
Both works are direct responses to
measures taken in the wake of the
financial crisis, and particularly
the various stimulus measures designed to reconstitute what Stiegler
calls the “consumerist model,”
which he argues is “obsolete” (4).
At the same time, the short works
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can be considered summaries of
Stiegler’s larger projects, such as
the three volume Technics and
Time, deploying the conceptual apparatus so central to those works
(tertiary retention and grammatization, the industrial or technical
history of memory, and so forth). A
full exposition of Stiegler’s tightly
woven and terminologically heavy
argument would likely require a
treatment the length of the volume
itself. For my purposes here, I hope
merely to locate some consonances
on the question of contribution.
For Stiegler, the disaster of the
financial crisis is not accidental but
a logical outcome of the course of
capitalist development. The first
essay traces this development by
pursuing two themes: the development of proletarianization beyond
Marx’s concept, and a redefinition
of investment that would counter speculation. The first theme
requires Stiegler’s concept of tertiary retention and grammatization, which can be defined as the
exteriorization of various kinds
of knowledges. If Marx could detect the exteriorization of forms of
work, or knowledge of making,
he could not predict the exteriorization of forms of life, or knowledge of living, that would come to
dominate the experience of consumer society. Whereas the first
kind of proletarianization leads to,
and Stiegler remains classical on
this point, the transformation of
labor power into a commodity, the

second affects libidinal economy,
transforming desire into drives.
The result is an economic system
in which consumers lose their own
knowledge of “living,” having both
their social relationships and material desires exteriorized, calculated,
and packaged for them, while speculators hurry after satisfaction of
short-term results rather than tending to long-term desires. Stiegler
seeks to redefine investment as an
ethic of care that extends networks
and practices (“long circuits of transindividuation”) into the future
rather than a system of drives that
seek short-term returns.
If one concept in the first essay
connects Stiegler’s analysis to
Shirky’s, it is otium, or the Roman
concept of “studious leisure” (53)—
the idea that people work on creative projects outside the time of
employment, even necessarily so,
since the temporality of creative
or noetic acts never quite maps
on to a remunerated work time.
While Stiegler discusses this “time
of leisure” in reference to the intermittents, or temporary cultural
workers, the outline of free time to
pursue and share work—as a form
of work, but not employment—
comes into focus. It is precisely
through such incalculable or immeasurable forms of cognitive work,
moreover, that Stiegler sees the potential for taking proletarianization (and its catastrophic results) in
another direction: the development
of alternative practices and forms of
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work and life, practices that would
constitute an economic “system of
care.” Indeed, Stiegler is at his most
Derridean on this point. As much
as the proletarianization of cognitive capacities expropriates forms
of knowledge, it also establishes the
space in which capital mutates, the
“rupture through which associated
milieus are formed” (48). Proletarianization, and capital in general, is
in this sense pharmacological, both
poison and medicine. Needless to
say, Marx already told us this, but
only, Stiegler suggests, in an industrial context. If the factories were
the site of proletarianization, they
were also the site where solidarity
developed. Stiegler’s advance here
is to recast that dynamic on digital networks: if networks are the
site in which cognitive knowledge
and knowledge of living are exteriorized and expropriated, they are
also the site in which new forms of
communal practices—transindividuation—emerge. Citing Mackenzie Wark’s The Hacker Manifesto
(2004) and Pikka Himanen’s The
Hacker Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (2001), Stiegler portrays
hackers in general as an example
of an associated milieu opened up
by proletarianization. He calls this
emergence, of course, the “economy
of contribution” (70).
Whereas the first essay could
be seen as a symptomology of
neoliberal capitalism, the second
develops the treatment plan. Despite the at times dizzying route by

which Stiegler’s argument travels,
his conclusions on the economy of
contribution are, in fact, not that
different from Shirky’s. The second essay ends with a section titled
“The Economy of Contribution as
a New Relation between Technical
System and Social System” (127).
In this concluding section, Stiegler
invokes software programmers as
the paradigm case for an economy
of contribution that would work as
the “sociotherapy” to poisonous elements of capital:
In 1990 Philippe Aigrin and
myself [sic] put forward the
idea that the software industry and its digital networks
will eventually cause associated techno-geographical
milieus of a new kind to appear, enabling human geography to interface with the
technical system, to make
it function and, especially,
to make it evolve, thanks to
this interfacing: collaborative technologies and free license software rest precisely
on the valorization of such
associated human milieus,
which also constitute technogeographical spaces for the
formation of positive externalities. (128–29)
Put more plainly, Stiegler sees free
and open source software development as having the potential
to develop into an alternative to

510	antonio ceraso
proletarianization and its attendant
short-termism. If the pathologies
of capitalism lead it structurally
to “carelessness,” these emerging
forms of activity—in an always
risky manner, of course—would
function “contra the economy of
carelessness” (129).
At times, Stiegler’s analysis of
contemporary political economy,
and certainly his initial demand
that philosophers pay attention
again to economics and critique, are
valuable, strikingly original, and
much needed. At other times, they
can sound like fairly commonplace
critiques of the excesses of neoliberal capital arrived at through an
odd process. For example, Stiegler
provides the following:
“This capital, however, becomes purely speculative
when it no longer measures
a capital of confidence in the
future of the assets of the production apparatus—in relation to which it constitutes,
as a system of anticipations,
capacities for investment—
but instead relies on operations which are purely
self-referential (such that anticipations created by the financial sub-system anticipate
nothing but itself and come at
the expense of the production
system) or else are oriented
toward the production apparatus, but are structurally
short-term (that is, based on

disinvestment, that is, on the
pillage of the production apparatus)” (81).
For anyone following the aftermath of the financial crisis, this
may sound—after extensive examination—like a fairly complex way
of restating the Wall Street–Main
Street or finance capital–productive industry divide we’ve heard
so much about (or even summarizing in philosophical terms the plot
of Oliver Stone’s Wall Street, 1987).
Even if such moments suggest that
Stiegler’s view of finance may itself
be limited by traditional categories
(investment vs. speculation, for instance), his critique is most useful
when it raises the question of the
relationship between the economy
of contribution and finance capital,
a question, I’ve suggested throughout, that requires further examination. It is also valuable for sketching
out the subjective components of
particular practices within an economy of contribution. Stiegler focuses on hackers and free and open
source programmers. I’ll now turn
to what may be considered another
location of such activities: the work
of mashup artists.
Aram Sinnreich’s Mashed Up
is a sustained and concrete examination of one particular kind of
contribution practice: the work of
mashup artists and its effect on the
social and aesthetic assumptions of
modernity. It is, in this sense, both
a remarkable study on its own and
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a useful supplement to the more
generalized analyses provided by
Shirky and Stiegler. Mashed Up is
structured in three parts: a theoretical discussion of music and the way
its production and consumption are
organized in societies; an empirical
examination—consisting mostly of
Sinnreich’s analysis of interviews—
of the effects of mashup practices
on the organization of aesthetic
production and consumption; and
a prognosis of these changes in a
closing section. Sinnreich’s thesis
is a careful one that attends to the
contemporary moment as a time
of transition. What we might observe in mashup practices is the
“rush to colonize the growing gray
area” between sets of binaries that
organized aesthetic production—
especially musical production—in
modernity.
These binaries depend, first, on
the social importance of regulating
music in the first place. Sinnreich
opens with what may be his most
startling argument, an analysis of
Socrates’s statements on music in
The Republic, which may appear to
readers of Plato like a series of seemingly esoteric riffs on Dorian and
Phrygian harmonies. But Sinnreich
draws out an appropriate premise,
“that musical aesthetics reflect and
influence sociopolitical structures,
and that innovative or challenging
aesthetics pose a consequent threat
to powerful institutions” (16). Sinnreich fills out this initial observation by creating a detailed matrix

through which musical regulation
and resistance to that regulation
may be analyzed, with legal, ideological, and commercial “sites of
institutional power” and “targets of
communal power,” on the one side,
and musical aesthetics, praxes, and
technologies occupying the “site of
communal power” and “target of
institutional power” (31). Where
these power relations are played
out, musical innovation occurs:
“[T]he opposing forces of musical
regulation and resistance combine
to alter the very codes and practices
under dispute” (31).
If the interplay of such power
relations were the whole story, of
course, one would expect rapid
and constant innovation. As Sinnreich notes, however, our ideas and
practices of both producing and
consuming music have retained a
notable constancy throughout the
modern period. The explanation
can be found in what Sinnreich
calls the “modern discursive framework,” which “serves as a kind of
cement, binding together ideas and
assumptions about how music operates, and what it means,” and, by so
doing, “encourages us to view and
hear music in certain ways, and precludes us from viewing it and hearing it in other ways” (40). Mashed
Up then sets out the structure of
the modern framework in a series
of binaries: art/craft, artist/audience, original/copy, performance/
composition, figure/ground, and
materials/tools. In describing the
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social function of these binaries,
Sinnreich is most at home in the
distinction between being-provided-for and contribution, where
the modern framework stabilizes
the function of scarce musical production and passive musical consumption. The artist/audience
binary, for example, interfered
with “art’s traditional function as
the repository of a shared cultural
lexicon,” thereby “erecting high
barriers to cultural participation”
and serving as an “obvious parallel” with “the production/consumption binary” (66). Disrupting
the stability of these binaries, for
Sinnreich, is what he calls configurable culture—the convergence of
communication technology and
culture that, among other properties, makes all cultural production
storable, editable, and customizable (in short, reconfigurable) on a
single platform. The study’s task is
to work through the effects of this
cultural emergence on the modern
framework.
In the second section of Mashed
Up, Sinnreich examine these
changes by presenting and analyzing interviews with mashup artists, musicians, and music industry
members. Each chapter addresses
one of the binaries established in
the first section. The interviews are
themselves fascinating, and Sinnreich’s interpretations of their meaning are astute and well qualified. If
two themes emerge throughout,
they are, first, that the beliefs and

practices of practitioners are in a
state of transition from the modern framework and, second, that
new values immanent to mashup
practices are emerging. What is
appearing, in other words, is an intermediate space, the gray area, between the binary oppositions. It is
itself undergoing a process of definition. On the originality/copy binary, for example, Sinnreich states
that “[d]espite the many shades of
gray emerging between the poles
of the modern framework’s original/copy binary, stylistic originality
remains a vital concern for many
configurable musicians” (146).
Those markers include criteria
like “selection and arrangement of
source material, temporal and spatial arrangement of sonic materials, transformative technique, and
overarching compositional and organizational sensibility” (146). On
the performance/composition binary, the interviews similarly demonstrate that the “distinction . . .
has become nearly impossible to
identify” (158), while DJs nevertheless either develop “taxonomic
criteria” or “claim to encompass the
entire musical labor cycle” (158).
Sinnreich’s target throughout this
section is the limiting and limited
legal frameworks to which such
rich and complex production processes are often submitted.
Whereas the second section
contains Sinnreich’s primary examination of mashup practices, the
third section moves to assessment:

On contribution societies	 513
it seeks to determine whether and
to what extent the dialectical action
between regulation and resistance
may transform cultural understandings and practices of music.
Sinnreich presents a measured
analysis of the complexity of this
field, addressing the way mashup
practices depart from and enter
into traditional institutional relationships and categories. The final
chapter develops five “premises” for
the “cultural logic of configurability” (196). These include a “reorientation of the relationship between
the individual and the collective”
(196); a “newly flexible workforce
that both bears the burden and the
benefits of free agency” (198); a reorganization of the public and the
private (199–200); the emergence
of “recursive [rather than linear]
modes of narration, analysis, and
other epistemological processes”
(202); and a “fifth general principle”
called DJ Consciousness. The last
premise constitutes the subjectivity of configurable culture, shaped
and interacting with the other conditions; it is a consciousness that
recognizes itself as sharing in a collective marginalization “by principles of aesthetic exceptionalism, the
division of musical labor, and the
propertization of expression that
characterized the modern framework,” but also a consciousness that
recognizes forms of “embracing
self-ness and other-ness through
reconfiguring and reimagining our
cultural environments” (203). It is a

consciousness confronting itself in
novel ways, awash in “a new fluidity,” in which we “confront our
public selves through the monitor
of a surveillance camera or a Facebook profile editor” while having
the “ability to retrieve, reconfigure,
and redistribute such information,
and in so doing, to participate in
the production of shared meaning”
(204).
Mashed Up is certainly among
the most detailed and thoughtful
of any current work on particular sites of open source culture. If
Sinnreich is careful to draw from
his analysis a gray area and a series of potentialities (which is to
say, Sinnreich insists on the transitional character of our understandings and practices of music), the
book itself might be seen as similarly transitional in its discursive
positioning. By establishing the
dialectical forces as a matter of regulation and resistance, Sinnreich
almost necessarily falls back on
the contestations between configurable culture and a legal apparatus
of intellectual property. Certainly,
his subject matter requires that
these contestations be part of the
discussion; in music, perhaps more
so than in other areas of contribution, the legal disputes are front
and center. Yet the clash between
restrictive (and outmoded) legal
concepts and resistant cultural
practices has been the primary way
of framing these disputes in open
source discourse, and it comes at
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some cost. Specifically, the practices of the culture tend to take
on an almost heroic appearance,
where the power that impinges on
them is extrinsic, as is the power
they exercise. Foucault described
one of his main objectives as “discovering why the West has insisted
for so long on seeing the power it
exercises as juridical and negative
rather than as technical and positive.”5 Framing the contest between
regulation and resistance almost
inevitably replays this problem. At
the same time, Sinnreich departs
significantly from the by now expected struggle between music industry copyright lawyers and DJs.
He does so by outlining, in more
detail and with more insight than
most, the emerging power relations within configurable culture,
whether understood as developing aesthetic criteria that supplant
the modern framework or as the
premises for a new cultural logic.
In this way, Mashed Up moves beyond the stasis of the copyright and
intellectual property battles, even if
it falls back into them for rhetorical purposes. If the mashup artists
are themselves colonizing the gray
areas between the binaries of the
discursive framework, Sinnreich’s
own text might be said to stake its
position in the binary between the
“juridical and negative” and the
“technical and positive.” DJ Consciousness, in this sense, seems to
designate both a romantic subject
resisting an external power and the

conflicted subject that Stiegler describes, poised between the crumbling solidarity of the industrial
moment and the reunion of labor
in a digital domain. Given the current configuration of legal restrictions and emergent cultural forms,
this may be the only transitional
position to occupy responsibly.
The need to address that configuration may also be why the question of the second clause in Adorno
and Horkheimer’s proclamation is
probably unanswerable at this time.
The three texts considered here all
posit open source culture as at the
very least a set of practices with the
potential for democratizing the political or reshaping the economic
through increased participation
or contribution establishing an alternative to the present. That participation would present such an
appearance is owing, in no small
part, to the condition of beingprovided-for that characterized
the industrial economy and its state
partner. When placed against the
backdrop of being-provided-for as
a form of passivity, and passive consumption in particular, contribution no doubt appears in a positive
light. But contribution has many
vectors. The way we contribute
to the media sphere is just one. It
may be tempting, then, to assume a
mantle of Adornian gloom. Given
the seamless coemergence of these
forms of contribution—from the
mashup to the 401(k), from free and
open source practices to neoliberal
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finance and the collapse of the welfare state—one might simply offer
a quasi reversal of the maxim, the
axiomatic quality of production
remaining constant but the direction of its strategies inverted: “Everyone may contribute so that none
may escape.” But this, too, would
oversimplify the complexity of the
emerging forms and practices. The
three texts here accomplish something dramatic by presenting the
complexity of this field of objects
and relationship, indeed, by introducing new objects and relationships into that field. The task for
criticism going forward will be to
wrangle with that complexity.
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